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Introduction 
After the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,1 the 
airline market moved toward consolidation with the Department of 
Justice remaining relatively taciturn.2 Since the deregulation, there 
 
1. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504 (codified at 49 
U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).  
2. But see, Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and 
Several States Will Sue to Stop United Airlines from Acquiring US 
Airways (Jul. 27, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_ 
releases/2001/8701.pdf (moving to block the proposed US Airways and 
United merger because “[t]he proposal did not assure competition for 
those adversely affected by the acquisition, such as passengers in east 
coast connect markets, and instead substituted regulation for competition 
on some key routes and created competitive harms through United’s and 
American’s agreement to jointly fly and price the New York, Washington 
and Boston shuttle routes”) (quoting R. Hewitt Pate, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General for the Department of Justice). 
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have been more than 160 airline bankruptcies3 and approximately $15 
billion in operative losses over the past decade.4  
Following the consummation of the United-Continental merger in 
2010, US Airways expressed interest in securing a merger of its own.5 
On November 29, 2011, American Airlines and its parent, AMR 
Corporation, filed for bankruptcy.6 American’s bankruptcy filing came 
after years of financial struggles ending with a $1.06 billion loss during 
the 2011 fiscal year.7 American sought a merger with US Airways to 
escape bankruptcy and regain profitability. The two airlines agreed to 
a stock swap valued at $18 billion.8 Citing concerns of market 
enervation, the DOJ initially moved to block the prospective American–
US Airways amalgamation.9 The newly formed airline would utilize 
American’s brand while operating under US Airways’ management. 
Critics argued that the DOJ’s suit illustrated disparate treatment with 
regard to prior airline mergers and possibly signified a new antitrust 
policy.10  
The Airline Deregulation Act seemingly left the airline industry in 
a state of economic turmoil. The DOJ, primarily concerned with 
competition and consumer protection, now faces the additional task of 
market preservation, which inadvertently factors into their antitrust 
calculus. In order to achieve economies of scale in the current climate, 
market consolidation is arguably a necessary evil. If an airline fails, the 
market suffers loss of competition with an already concentrated market. 
Alas, the DOJ is left with the task of reaching a sustainable level of 
profitability for airlines while maintaining competition.  
 
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-778T, AIRLINE MERGERS: 
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PROPOSED MERGER OF UNITED AND CONTINENTAL 
AIRLINES 4–5 (2010) (“While most of these bankruptcies affected small 
airlines that were eventually liquidated, 4 of the more recent bankruptcies 
(Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways) are among the largest 
corporate bankruptcies ever . . . .”).  
4. Id. 
5. See Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Airlines vs. History, Wall St. J., May 5, 
2010, at A19 (“We didn’t need seven of them in 2005. We don’t need four 
of them now. We need three.”) (quoting US Airways’ Doug Parker). 
6. In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 401 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
7. Id. at 397. 
8. Susan Carey, Fixing a “Fragile” Air Merger: US Airways CEO Kept the 
Faith During Antitrust Suit; New Challenges Await, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 
2013, at B1. 
9. See Complaint, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-
01236, (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Complaint].  
10. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, A Merger Too Far for U.S. and Airlines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2013, at B1 (“The government ‘abandoned the 
framework it used in approving the last three airline mergers,’ said Paul 
T. Denis, a partner at Dechert L.L.P. . . .”). 
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This Comment analyzes the approval of the American–US Airways 
merger and the economic impact on the airline industry. While many 
believe the DOJ’s treatment of the merger signals a shift in policy, this 
Comment will posit that the agency’s response is consistent with past 
practice. In fact, this Comment will suggest that the requirements the 
DOJ has imposed arguably do not do enough to remedy the potential 
anticompetitive issues produced by the combination. Part I outlines the 
complaints filed by the DOJ and explores the anticompetition concerns 
raised. Using the merger guideline’s framework, Part I discusses the 
alleged effects of the merger, as argued in the DOJ complaint. The 
already concentrated market conflated with the sizeable competition 
provided by two of the largest airlines proves the DOJ’s concerns to be 
legitimate.  
Part II details the litigation surrounding the prospective merger 
and explores the antitrust settlement. Comparing recent approved 
airline mergers, Part II argues that the settlement did not depart in 
any meaningful way from previous antitrust policy in the airline 
industry. The American–US Airways merger posed greater anticomp-
etition concerns than prior mergers causing the lawsuit. Ultimately, the 
economics and trial uncertainty resulted in larger scale divestments 
instead of an attempt to block the merger.  
Part III analyzes the sufficiency of the settlement in light of the 
original issues raised in the DOJ complaint and discusses the impact 
on the airline market. By considering the economic implications of the 
divestitures and the competition generated by Low Cost Carriers 
(LCCs), Part III calls into doubt the settlement’s ability to redress the 
original anticompetition concerns. Additionally, the economic impact 
on the market appears to be a net positive, as it addresses the faltering 
profitability of the airlines.  
I. Expect Delays: The DOJ Complaint 
In evaluating a proposed merger, the DOJ defines the market; 
calculates the market concentration; considers the unilateral effects, 
such as elimination of competition; and lastly contemplates potential 
coordinated behavior.11 Next, the DOJ balances the anticompetitive 
effects against possible procompetitive effects.12 Following the DOJ’s 
examination, Bill Baer, head of the Antitrust Division at the DOJ made 
the position of the agency perfectly clear when he stated that “[w]e 
think the right solution here is a full-stop injunction.”13 At first glance, 
 
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES §§ 4–7 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Merger Guidelines]. 
12. Id. at § 10. 
13. David Ingram & Karen Jacobs, U.S. Sues to Block AMR-US Airways 
Merger; Stocks Fall, REUTERS, Aug. 13, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ 
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a DOJ suit to block the American–US Airways merger appears to be a 
stark change with regard to past antitrust policy.14 
The State filed suit to block the American–US Airways deal, 
claiming the merger violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.15 The DOJ 
complaint relied upon the three anticompetitive effects penned in the 
Merger Guidelines: (1) increased competition, (2) increased coordinated 
behavior, and (3) elimination of head-to-head competition.16 
A. Increased Concentration 
Looking to individual markets, the American–US Airways merger 
would cause a significant increase in market concentrations. When 
evaluating the effects on market concentration, the DOJ often calcu-
lates the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) of market concentration 
by summing the squares of each firm’s market share.17 Generally, 
unconcentrated markets contain an HHI below 1,500, moderately 
concentrated markets contain an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500, and 
highly concentrated markets contain an HHI above 2,500.18 
Additionally, if a merger creates a highly concentrated market and 
“involve[s] an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points[, the merger] 
will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”19 A post-
merger American–US Airways would result in 1,000 city pairs, 
exceeding a 2,500-point HHI while also increasing the HHI by more 
than 200 points.20 Also, of particular importance, the market would 
consist primarily of three legacies, the major airlines with interstate 
routes prior to the Deregulation Act of 1978 and the competitive Low 




14. Stewart, supra note 10, at B1.  
15. Complaint, supra note 9, at 7. Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws 
acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
16. Complaint, supra note 9, at 12–32.  
17. 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at § 5.3. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. If such a presumption is created, “[t]he presumption may be rebutted 
by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance 
market power.” Id. 
20. Amended Complaint at 14, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No. 
1:13-cv-01236 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Amended Complaint]. 
21. See Competition and Bankruptcy in the Airline Industry: The Proposed 
Merger of American Airlines and US Airways: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 107 (2013) [hereinafter Airline 
Hearings] (statement of Christopher L. Sagers, James A. Thomas 
Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State University) (“American 
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four airline carriers with control over 80 percent of the domestic airline 
market.22 Ultimately, the airline industry currently operates at 
abnormally high concentration throughout various markets, and if HHI 
receives credence, the merger will cause anticompetitive effects. 
However, market share statistics are not conclusive but merely a factor 
to be considered.23 
B. Coordinated Behavior 
The oligopolistic nature and readily transparent pricing in the 
deregulation era of the airline industry makes coordinated pricing and 
decreased service relatively simple to implement. Coordinating behavior 
for an industry dominated by five firms is perhaps not as disconcerting 
as an industry dominated by four firms. The DOJ pointed to four post-
merger results that would increase coordinated behavior: (1) 
elimination of US Airways’ Advantage Fares program, (2) increased 
capacity discipline, (3) elimination of American’s expansion plans, and 
(4) increased fares.24  
US Airways plays a pivotal role in airline competition through its 
Advantage Fares program, which offers discounted one-stop fares that 
compete with nonstop fares.25 Because US Airways would no longer be 
competing with American, the DOJ expressed concern that the merger 
would eliminate, or significantly curtail, US Airways’ Advantage Fare 
program and, in turn, eliminate important competitive effects.26 The 
merger, in theory, would put an end to the one-stop discounted rate 
offered by US Airways.  
The DOJ additionally cited concerns that a post-merger market 
would increase the practice of capacity discipline. Use of capacity 
discipline—intentionally keeping a lower capacity growth in order to 
increase returns—has become ubiquitous among legacies in order to 
regain profitability in times of rising fuel prices and a depressed 
 
/U.S. Airways deal would leave the sector with only four major players: 
United, Delta, American and Southwest. Nationally, those four firms will 
hold more than 70% of airline travel.”). 
22. Ingram & Jacobs, supra note 13.  
23. See Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322, n.38 (1962) 
(“Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the industry 
leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the primary index of 
market power; but only a further examination of the particular market—
its structure, history and probable future—can provide the appropriate 
setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.”). 
24. See Complaint, supra note 9, at 15–30. 
25. See Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 18 (stating that US Airways’ 
one-stop flights are “up to 40% cheaper than other airlines’ nonstop 
service”). 
26. Id. at 18–23. 
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economy.27 Industry consolidation allows for greater use, or perhaps 
abuse, of capacity discipline. Industry trends prove an increase in 
limiting service through this practice.28 Noting the economic benefits, 
the DOJ ultimately expressed disdain for the decline in flights and 
resulting increase in fares.29 Airline executives, including the president 
of US Airways, have stated the important effects of capacity discipline 
and show no signs of cutting this practice.30 Giving more force to the 
DOJ’s argument, post-merger United “reduced capacity at nearly all of 
its major hubs (including Cleveland) and at many other airports where 
the two airlines previously competed.”31 Perhaps the most important 
effect of capacity discipline by an American–US Airways merger would 
 
27. See MICHAEL D. WITTMAN, AN ASSESSMENT OF AIR SERVICE ACCESSIBIL-
ITY IN U.S. METROPOLITAN REGIONS, 2007–2012, AT 17 (2014), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87063 (“[T]he number of flights at most 
U.S. airports decreased from 2007 [to] 2012 as airlines reconfigured their 
networks and practiced ‘capacity discipline’ in the face of high fuel prices 
and a recessed economy . . . .”); see also MICHAEL D. WITTMAN & WILLIAM 
S. SWELBAR, TRENDS AND MARKET FORCES SHAPING SMALL COMMUNITY 
AIR SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/87064 (“Instead of operating as many 
flights as possible in an attempt to gain market share, large airlines began 
a more efficient capacity and network management paradigm in an 
attempt to reduce operating costs by removing redundant flying and 
rationalizing service at some smaller hubs.”). 
28. See Chris Tarry, ANALYSIS: Capacity discipline still necessary despite 
rosier economic outlook, Airline Business (May 2, 2014) (“In terms of 
regional variation, the capacity discipline evident among the North 
American airlines seems to be continuing. Within the North American 
domestic market, capacity in 2014 is expected to be just 2% higher than 
in 2013, following a 2.2% increase last year.”), available at http://www. 
flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysis-capacity-discipline-still-necessary 
-despite-rosier-economic-398254/. 
29. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 23–26.  
30. See, e.g., Press Release, Delta Air Lines, Delta Air Lines Announces 
September Quarter Profit (Oct. 25, 2011) http://news.delta.com/index. 
php?s=20295&item=123808 (“With continued capacity discipline, 
coupled with improvements we are making in our product and service, we 
are well positioned to deal with the impact of today’s high fuel prices and 
an uncertain economy.”) (quoting Delta’s President Ed Bastian); Jay 
Boehmer, Carriers Continue to Make the Most of Capacity Control, Bus. 
Travel News, June 28, 2010, at 19 (“‘One of the most important things 
that happened in the industry is capacity discipline,’ US Airways 
president Scott Kirby said. ‘In 2009, you saw all airlines reduce capacity, 
following the spike in fuel and the bad revenue environment. What was 
unique about 2008 and 2009 capacity is that not only the legacy carriers 
reduced capacity, but for the first time in history of the industry the low-
cost carriers by and large reduced capacity . . . .’”) 
31. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 25. 
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be a resulting decline in connectivity.32 A more concentrated market 
would increase coordinated efforts to reduce seating and services in 
order to increase profitability. 
American’s original bankruptcy plan consisted of firm growth and 
expansion, which the DOJ believed would end if the merger goes 
through. American submitted a plan that consisted of concentrating on 
their five key hubs by “[e]xpanding American international presence,” 
utilizing “codesharing,” “implementing a long-term fleet plan, creating 
a capital structure that allows American to grow,” and “setting up a 
sustainable cost structure.”33 The complaint argued that with the 
merger, American would likely abandon their previous plan to increase 
flights.34 Eliminating overlapping routes, in part, makes the airline 
mergers financially advantageous. US Airways executives argued that 
the combined networks would create additional connecting routes and 
ultimately expand service.35 A merger between American and US 
Airways would undercut the incentive and need for American’s 
expansion.  
The price fixing paradigm generally accepts that fewer firms in a 
market increases the ease in which prices can be coordinated. The 
complaint cited recent examples of coordinated pricing that persist at 
current concentration levels.36 Given the close nature and transparency  
32. See, e.g., Wittman, supra note 27, at 19 (“Very large regions of over 5 
million residents saw their average Air Service Accessibility Index score 
decrease by 10.2% from 2007 [to] 2012. While this is a significant decline, 
it is less than the average decline of 11.6% for all regions [over] the same 
period. Medium-sized regions with populations of 0.5 million—5 million 
felt the biggest brunt of the decline in service at medium-sized U.S. 
airports. These regions lost about 14.3% of their air service accessibility, 
on average, from 2007 [to] 2012.”); see also Wittman & Swelbar, supra 
note 27, at 3 (“Instead of operating as many flights as possible in an 
attempt to gain market share, large airlines began a more efficient 
capacity and network management paradigm in an attempt to reduce 
operating costs by removing redundant flying and rationalizing service at 
some smaller hubs.”). 
33. In re AMR Corp., 477 B.R. 384, 402 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
34. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 26. 
35. Airline Hearings, supra note 21, at 35 (statement of Stephen L. Johnson, 
Executive Vice President, Corporate and Government Affairs of US 
Airways, Inc.) (“To illustrate the effect of the superior combined network, 
even if you focus only on airports with more than 50 departures per week, 
the merger will create over 1,300 new online connecting routes benefiting 
millions of passengers.”). 
36. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 27 (“American 
announced that it would charge for a first checked bag on May 21, 2008. 
On June 12, 2008, both United and US Airways followed American’s lead. 
Similarly, over a period of just two weeks this spring, all four legacy 
airlines increased their ticket change fee for domestic travel from $150 to 
$200.”). 
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of current airline practices, high levels of coordinated pricing and 
business schemes already exist, and it seems inconclusive whether one 
less legacy can aggravate the current conditions. 
C. Elimination of Competition 
The new American would dethrone Delta as the largest domestic 
airline carrier, raising concerns of a likely decrease in competition. Pre-
merger American and US Airways competed against each other, with 
nonstop service on seventeen routes domestically.37 Arguably, a 
generally undifferentiated product, such as airline travel, exacerbates 
this concern.38 Indeed, LCCs, with the exception of Southwest, cannot 
provide the necessary competition to the legacy dominated market.39 
The complaint particularly singled out Reagan National, noting that 
the combined airline would possess 69 percent of the slots.40 Moreover, 
American would no longer be competing at Reagan National against 
US Airways’ already dominant presence. For these reasons, elimination 
of a legacy post-merger undercuts significant competition in the market. 
D. Procompetitive Effects 
The DOJ alleged an absence of procompetitive effects regarding the 
prospective merger.41 It may, however, be axiomatic that a DOJ 
complaint seeking to prevent a merger would not contain propitious 
effects of the proposed transaction. Specifically, the complaint states 
that the merger would not result in expansion and the new airline would 
participate in coordinating conduct.42  
 
37. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 30. 
38. See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 11, at § 6.3 (“In markets involving 
relatively undifferentiated products, the Agencies may evaluate whether 
the merged firm will find it profitable unilaterally to suppress output and 
elevate the market price. A firm may leave capacity idle, refrain from 
building or obtaining capacity that would have been obtained absent the 
merger, or eliminate pre-existing production capabilities.”). 
39. See Airline Hearings, supra note 21, at 109 (statement of Christopher L. 
Sagers, James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law Cleveland State 
University) (“While there are a few remaining LCCs that have some 
wherewithal to compete, the only LCC whose entry has ever persistently 
driven down fares in city-pair markets is Southwest, and Southwest has 
now achieved a nationwide presence of its own and its costs are believed 
to have risen as well.”). 
40. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 30.  
41. Complaint, supra note 9, at 6–7.  
42. Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 33.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Searching for the Sweet Spot 
495 
II. Cleared for Take-Off: The Settlement 
A. Previous Mergers 
The Delta-Northwest merger in 2008 and the United Airlines–
Continental merger in 2010 provide the most relevant examples of the 
DOJ’s current antitrust policy in the airline industry. Delta acquired 
Northwest in a $2.6 billion deal that crowned Delta the largest airline 
at the time.43 The DOJ closed its investigation of the Delta-Northwest 
merger by issuing a statement highlighting the anticipated efficiencies 
and procompetitive effects.44 The DOJ chose not to implement any 
remedial measures and approved the merger. The effects of the merger, 
however, paint a contrary picture. All other things held constant, the 
merger caused the total passengers in 2009 to decline by 5.3 percent45 
compared to the 3.5 percent decline the prior year.46 Additionally, 
Delta’s Cincinnati hub saw a 50 percent decline in passengers between 
2005 and 2009.47 The elimination of Northwest as a separate competitor 
equated roughly to a 5.1 percent increase in fare price, at least in the 
short run.48  
 
43. John Crawley, Delta Buys Northwest to Create Biggest Airline, Reuters 
(Oct. 30, 2008, 7:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2008/10/30/us-delta-northwest-idUSTRE49S8BA20081030. 
44. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of The Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of 
the Merger of Delta Air Lines Inc. and Northwest Airlines Corporation 
(Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-at-
963.html (“[T[he merger likely will result in efficiencies such as cost 
savings in airport operations, information technology, supply chain 
economics, and fleet optimization that will benefit consumers. Consumers 
are also likely to benefit from improved service made possible by 
combining under single ownership the complementary aspects of the 
airlines’ networks.”). 
45. Press Release, Dep’t of Transp., Summary 2009 Traffic Data for U.S and 
Foreign Airlines: Total Passengers Down 5.3 Percent from 2008 (March 
29, 2010), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/default/files/rita_ 
archives/bts_press_releases/2010/bts015_10/pdf/bts015_10.pdf. 
46. Press Release, Dep’t of Transp., Summary 2008 Traffic Data for U.S and 
Foreign Airlines: Total Passengers Down 3.5 Percent from 2007 (Apr. 23, 
2009), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/default/files/rita_ 
archives/bts_press_releases/2009/bts019_09/pdf/bts019_09.pdf. 
47. John W. Fischer & Michaela D. Platzer, Airline Industry Mergers: Issues 
of Congressional Interest, in Airline Industry Mergers: 
Background and Issues 1, 7 (Felix J. Mercado ed., 2011). 
48. See Dan Luo, The Price Effects of the Delta/Northwest Airline Merger, 
44 Rev. Indus. Org. 27, 45 (2013) (“Although . . . the regression 
coefficient of DL/NW overlap routes is insignificant in nonstop markets, 
the actual fares increased by 5.1%. There is a positive fare trend between 
the periods, but another reason for the positive price effect is that the 
merger appeared to cause exit by LCCs that provided nonstop service.”). 
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The United-Continental merger came on the heels of the DOJ’s 
rejection of Continental’s request for antitrust immunity to work with 
United, among other carriers, in setting prices and scheduling.49 In a 
similar financial state as American, United and Continental faced 
significant losses in 2009.50 Like the American–US Airways presence at 
Reagan National, United-Continental’s resulting 60 percent control out 
of Newark gave the DOJ pause.51 Ultimately, the United-Continental 
investigation ended with the airlines agreeing to transfer slots at 
Continental’s key hub, Newark, to Southwest.52 Satisfied with the 
remedial divestiture, the DOJ stated that the merger “will likely 
significantly benefit consumers on overlap routes as well as on many 
other routes.”53 For many observers, approval seemed inevitable 
because the airlines contained complimentary routes with minimal 
overlap.54 The newly formed airline became the largest airline. The 
merger did not come without complications. The new airline hit 
turbulence with consumers, ranking worst for the number of consumer 
complaints, but that is an aside from the competition focus.55 
 
But cf. id. at 45 (finding that the change in overlap markets was close to 
zero). The results are based on the first quarter of 2008 (pre-merger) data 
and the second quarter of 2010 (post-merger) data. Id. at 30. 
49. Dealbook, D.O.J. Opposes Antitrust Immunity for Continental, N.Y. 
Times (June 30, 2009, 6:05 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/ 
06/30/doj-opposes-antitrust-immunity-for-continental/. 
50. See Fischer & Platzer, supra note 47, at 7 (“[R]evenues were down 19.1% 
at United (losing $651 million) and 17.4% at Continental (losing $282 
million) between 2008 and 2009.”). 
51. Julie Johnsson, Antitrust Regulators OK United-Continental Deal, Chi. 
Trib., Aug. 28, 2010, at C8. 
52. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, United Airlines and Continental Transfer 
Assets to Southwest Airlines in Response to Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Concerns (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Continental-United Press 
Release], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-at-974.html. 
53. Id.  
54. See Justin Dickerson, Antitrust in the Skies: The United and Olympic 
Airline Mergers, 15 Touro Intl. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2012) (“Nonetheless, most 
industry experts also anticipated that United and Continental would face 
few antitrust objections. United and Continental separately shared no 
hubs, and were not in significant ‘head-to-head’ competition as horizontal 
competitors on many routes domestically or internationally.”). 
55. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Air Travel Consumer Report 42 (2012) 
available at http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2012 
AugustATCR_1.pdf (averaging 6.86 complaints per 100,000 
enplanements compared to the 2.50 complaints for the second worst). 
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More recently, the DOJ approved a Southwest-Airtran merger56 in 
2011 without the remedial measures that were present in the United-
Continental merger.57 Indeed, the DOJ believed that the merger would 
ultimately be beneficial to consumers through “new service on routes.”58 
The minimal route overlap and size differential prevents a meaningful 
analogy to the American–US Airways merger. The Southwest-Airtran 
merger did not involve a legacy nor did it concern the same market 
concentration as the American–US Airways merger. 
B. Current Settlement 
In remedying an anticompetitive merger, agencies utilize two types 
of remedies: structural and conduct.59 Agencies express a preference for 
structural remedies due to the increased certainty provided and their 
cost-effective nature.60 Given previous concerns over effective monitor-
ing and collusion allegations,61 a structural divestiture settlement 
seemed inevitable. Furthermore, the DOJ implemented similar divesti-
tures in the United-Continental merger.62 
 
56. The transaction is actually an acquisition but has become commonly 
termed a “merger” and still provides a relevant example. 
57. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of 
Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision to Close Its Investigation of 
Southwest’s Acquisition of Airtran (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-at-523.html (noting that the DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division “did not challenge the acquisition after considering the consumer 
benefits”). 
58. Id. 
59. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to 
Merger Remedies 6 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf (“Structural remedies generally will 
involve the sale of physical assets by the merging firms or requiring that 
the merged firm create new competitors through the sale or licensing of 
intellectual property rights. . . . A conduct remedy usually entails 
provisions that prescribe certain aspects of the merged firm’s post-
consummation business conduct.”). 
60. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to 
Merger Remedies 7 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/guidelines/205108.pdf (“Structural remedies are preferred to 
conduct remedies because in merger cases because they are relatively clean 
and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement in the 
market.”); see also Jessica C. Strock, Setting the Terms of a Break-Up: 
The Convergence of Federal Merger Remedy Policies, 53 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 2147, 2154 (2012) (“An analysis of divestiture policy is important 
because the agencies favor divestitures over other types of merger 
remedies.”). 
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
62. See Continental–United Press Release, supra note 52. 
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Providing transparency for the airline industry or quelling critics, 
the DOJ issued its Competitive Impact Statement outlining the current 
settlement and its remedial nature. The settlement agreement “requires 
the divestiture of slots, gates, and ground facilities at key airports 
around the country to permit the entry or expansion of airlines that 
can provide meaningful competition in numerous markets. . . .”63 
Specifically, the new American must divest 104 slots at Reagan 
National, thirty-four slots at LaGuardia, and two airport gates at each 
Boston Logan, Chicago O’Hare, Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles 
International, and Miami International.64 
In application, the merged airlines lost 15 percent of the combined 
airline slots at Reagan and 7 percent at LaGuardia.65 The settlement 
also accounted for fears of further expansion of the new airline 
powerhouse. The settlement prevents reacquisition of divested slots and 
requires advanced notification of any slot acquisition at Reagan 
National, regardless of whether it meets the HSR Act threshold.66 
The Department of Transportation shared interests and concerns 
with the DOJ and entered into its own agreement with the merging 
airlines. Primarily concerned with the merger’s effect on smaller 
communities, the agreement required the newly formed airline to 
“schedule all commuter slots held or operated by US Airways, AMR, 
or New American . . . to serve Medium, Small and Non-hub airports 
for a term . . . of five . . . years.”67 
Passing DOJ scrutiny represented perhaps the steepest hurdle; 
however, the merger required further clearance. Opponents of the 
settlement sought a TRO in contemplation of their pending civil suit 
under Section 26 of the Clayton Act.68 The bankruptcy court ultimately 
denied the Plaintiffs’ TRO and allowed the transaction to proceed.69 
Determined, challengers proceeded to the D.C. District Court. The 
District Court held that the proposed settlement was in the public 
 
63. Competitive Impact Statement at 2, United States v. US Airways Grp., 
Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101877 (D.D.C. Nov. 11, 2013) (No. 1:13-cv-
01236-CKK) [hereinafter Competitive Impact Statement]. 
64. Id. at 2–3.  
65. Bart Jansen, Justice Settles Merger Lawsuit with AA, US Airways, USA 
Today (Nov. 12, 2013, 2:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
travel/flights/2013/11/12/justice-merger-american-us-airways/3506367/. 
66. Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 14. 
67. Agreement Regarding Merger Between US Airways Group, 
Inc., and AMR Corporation 1 (2013), available at http://www.dot. 
gov/stes/dot.dev/files/docs/FinalAgreement_DOT_US_AA_.pdf. 
68. Section 26 allows private parties to sue for injunctive relief based on 
anticipated damage caused by an alleged violation of antitrust laws. 
15 U.S.C. § 26 (2012). 
69. In re AMR Corp., 502 B.R. 23, 42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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interest under the Tunney Act.70 Citing the low rational basis standard, 
the District Court rejected concerns of loss of routes and lack of scale 
for the divestments.71  
Anticompetitive concerns surfaced on an international level as well. 
The European Commission notably determined that the merger would 
cause a monopoly for the London–Philadelphia route at the London 
Heathrow airport.72 In similar fashion to the DOJ, the European 
commission utilized divestitures and cleared the transaction.73  
While some onlookers may view the treatment of the American–US 
Airways merger as new antitrust policy for the airline industry, the 
DOJ’s action appears in congruence with previous mergers and shifting 
market conditions. Indeed, the $11 billion American–US Airways 
merger74 encapsulated greater route overlap in a more concentrated 
market75 than the previous mergers. Perhaps the uncertainty of trial 
prompted the settlement, or perhaps it was an unwillingness to pay 
higher fares by the many DOJ employees flying out of D.C. Ultimately, 
the uncertainty of trial and prospective economic analysis likely carried 
the day.76 
 
70. United States v. US Airway Grp., Inc., No. 13-cv-1236 (CKK), 2014 WL 
1653269 (D.C.C. Apr. 25, 2014). The District Court found the divestitures 
to LCCs to be adequate in order to offset the anticompetitive effects of 
the merger and stated that the settlement will provide LCCs “new 
incentives to invest in new capacity and generate additional passenger 
demand.” Id. at 29–30. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) requires a comment period 
for judgments entered into by the United States in order to determine 
whether the judgment represents public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) 
(2012). 
71. US Airway Grp. 2014 WL 1653269, at *7. 
72. Press Release, European Comm’n, Mergers: Commission Approves 
Proposed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines’ Holding 
Company AMR Corporation, Subject to Conditions (Aug. 5, 2013) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-764_en.pdf. 
73. Id. (“US Airways and American Airlines submitted commitments to 
release one daily slot pair at London Heathrow and Philadelphia airports, 
and also provided further incentives such as the possibility for a new 
entrant to acquire grandfathering rights after a certain period of time.”).  
74. Jia Lynn Yang & Ashley Halsey III, Antitrust Officials Sue to Block US 




75. See supra Part I.A. 
76. See J. Parker Erkmann, Drama at the Courthouse Door: The US Airways-
American Merger, 1 Air & Space L. Jul. 1, 2014, at 1, 16 (“The DOJ’s 
decision to settle reflects the significant litigation risk it faced. While all 
settlements reflect an assessment of litigation risk, the DOJ was under 
intense pressure. It had the burden of proving that the transaction would 
substantially lessen competition. This showing would be made with 
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III. Possible Turbulence: 
An Analysis of the Settlement 
A. Adequacy of the Settlement 
The airports requiring divestitures in the settlement undoubtedly 
address the anticompetitive arguments addressed in the DOJ complaint 
at least to some extent at those airports; however, the remedial nature 
is less certain at the other concentrated airports not requiring divest-
itures. Rationalizing the settlement’s anticompetitive effects in other 
markets or airports presents a separate challenge. Additionally, the 
DOJ’s settlement does not seek preservation of US Airways’ Advantage 
Fare program.77 The DOJ cannot rest on its laurels regarding the 
Reagan National and LaGuardia divestitures while neglecting to 
address the harm posed to passengers at other airports.78 In thorough 
fashion, the initial complaint outlined more than 1,000 city pairs with 
an HHI increase in the highly concentrated range,79 yet only seven 
airports require divestments. Of course, the divested airports will affect 
other airports through connecting routes.  
The Competitive Impact Statement issued by the DOJ defends the 
then anticipated pushback from merger opponents.80 Unremarkably and 
unsurprisingly, the CIS outlined anticipated benefits of LCC expansion 
and the void it will fill given the loss of a legacy. In pertinent part, the 
CIS estimates that the divestments allow LCCs to provide an additional 
four million seats per a year at Reagan National and 1.5 million seats 
per year at LaGuardia.81 
Stepping away from market specifics, the settlement does not 
provide for a similar legacy powerhouse like American and its pre-
merger expansion plan.82 The original complaint highlighted the highly  
documents and testimony of the parties and industry participants and 
economic analysis as presented by testifying experts.”). 
77. But cf. United States v. US Airways, Grp., Inc., 79 Fed. Reg. 14,279, 
14,287 (Mar. 13, 2014) (“[T]he benefits of LCC entry and expansion 
enabled by the remedy will extend to a larger number of passengers and 
deliver a greater overall benefit to consumers as compared to the 
Advantage Fares program.”). 
78. See Kottaras v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 16, 25 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(“[A] merger that substantially decreases competition in one place—
injuring consumers there—is not saved because it benefits a separate 
group of consumers by creating competition elsewhere.”). 
79. See Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at Appendix A. 
80. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63. 
81. Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed 
Final Judgment at 11, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., No. 1:13-
cv-01236 (CKK) (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Response]. 
82. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 8 (“The proposed 
remedy will not create a new independent competitor, nor does it purport 
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competitive effects of US Airways’ Advantage Fares and their effect on 
competition with nonstop fares provided by legacies, yet the settlement 
makes little mention of remedial measures for the inevitable demise of 
Advantage Fares.83 In other words, the settlement does not adequately 
explain how the divestitures will redress many of the original 
anticompetitive concerns. 
The DOJ ended its investigation of the United-Continental merger 
after the airlines promised to divest certain gates.84 Three years later, 
the DOJ appeared to have buyer’s remorse with the deal, using the 
result of the transaction as a justification for blocking the American–
US Airways merger.85 Of course, the present settlement requires more 
extensive divestments. Even still, the total divested slots reflect an 
approximate 112 daily flights a day in comparison to the 6,700 daily 
flights that the new airline will operate a day.86 Assistant Attorney 
General William Baer argued that the divestments allow for LCCs to 
disrupt the tight-knit, legacy-dominated market in a way that would 
otherwise be impossible.87 In D.C. fashion, the DOJ turned the once 
cautionary tale of United-Continental into a supporting case for the 
current settlement. The thirty-six divested slots allowed Southwest to 
create five nonstop routes, which led to sixty connecting routes.88  
Slots at specific airports like Reagan National and LaGuardia and 
the limited gates at other airports, which rarely change hands, maintain 
difficult and almost insurmountable barriers to entry. Arguably, the 
settlement enabled the DOJ to address the longstanding concern of 
 
to replicate American’s capacity expansion plans or create Advantage 
Fares where they might otherwise be eliminated.”). 
83. See Letter from the American Antitrust Institute et al., to William H. 
Stallings, Chief, Transp., Energy & Agric. Section of the Dep’t of Justice 
Antitrust Div. 11 (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/cases/usairways/comments/aaus010.pdf [hereinafter AAI 
Letter] (“[C]onsumers on the routes where American and US Airways 
competed with nonstop service will be harmed (such as those flying 
between Charlotte and Dallas-Ft. Worth), as will the ‘[m]illions of 
consumers [who] have benefitted’ from Advantage Fares . . . .”) (quoting 
Complaint, supra note 9). 
84. See Continental-United Press Release, supra note 3.  
85. See Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 25 (“United and Continental 
closed their deal on October 1, 2010. The combined firm has reduced 
capacity at nearly all of its major hubs (including Cleveland) and at many 
other airports where the two airlines previously competed.”). 
86. Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Justice Dept. Clears Airlines’ Merger, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2013, at B2. 
87. Id. 
88. Response, supra note 81, at 9–10. 
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LCC expansion by facilitating LCC entry at major airports.89 In 
consideration of the limited divestments in comparison to the inevitably 
greater loss of routes due to overlap, it is important to note that legacies 
and LCCs are not equal in market impact. Specifically, the impact on 
price fares caused by entry of a legacy pales in comparison to fare 
reductions caused by entry of an LCC.90 The DOJ response brief cited 
JetBlue’s entry into the Reagan National to Boston route, which 
reportedly caused average fares to drop by 39 percent and passengers 
to almost double.91 Allowing LCCs to enter the market, the settlement 
can prove a disrupter for previously tight-knit coordination among the 
legacies.  
Perhaps the added competition that LCCs will provide to the 
divested airport slots and gates address the expansive anticompetitive 
arguments originally raised. Even still, the consensus on LCCs is 
splintered, at best, with Southwest providing the most significant 
competition.92 Most notably, LCCs do not have the necessary network 
to adequately compete with the now three legacies.93 The settlement 
does, however, allow for LCC expansion, but given the limited and 
 
89. See id. at 8 (“The LCCs that acquire the assets will establish stronger 
positions at strategically important destinations—including top business 
markets—where it has been particularly difficult to obtain access. These 
assets will provide them with the incentive to invest in new capacity and 
position them to offer more meaningful competition system-wide, forcing 
legacy carriers to respond to that increased competition.”). 
90. See Jan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee & Ethan S. Singer, Airline Competition 
and Domestic US Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2 Econ. of 
Transp. 1, 2 (2013) (“The presence of in-market, nonstop LCC 
competition reduces fares by as much as 33% in the nonstop markets, and 
adjacent LCC competition in these markets reduces fares by as much as 
20%. . . . The addition of a second legacy nonstop carrier reduces fares by 
at most 5.3% in these markets, with a third carrier having no fare effect.”).  
91. Response, supra note 81, at 10. 
92. Compare Michael D. Wittman & William Swelbar, Evolving 
Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competition, 
Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers, 20 (2013) (“The presence 
of an LCC like Southwest, JetBlue, Allegiant, or Spirit is associated with 
a decrease in average one-way fare of between $15 [and] $36, depending 
on the airline and the year and controlling for distance and other airport 
characteristics. However, the presence of AirTran and Frontier no longer 
have a significant effect on average one-way fares once other LCC 
competition is taken into account.”), with Luo, supra note 48, at 37 (“The 
presence of Southwest lowers fares by 7%, while the coefficient of other 
LCC competitors providing connecting service is insignificant.”). 
93. See Amended Complaint, supra note 20, at 3–4 (“That enhanced 
cooperation is unlikely to be significantly disrupted by Southwest and 
JetBlue, which, while offering important competition on the routes they 
fly, have less extensive domestic and international route networks than 
the legacy airlines.”). 
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airport-specific divestments, the LCCs will likely be unable to realize 
the growth needed to generate systemic competition.94 In modern times, 
Low Cost Carrier may be a misnomer as operating costs of LCCs 
increase.95 Additionally, the uncertainty as to which LCCs will receive 
the divested slots and gates, along with the uncertainty as to how those 
assets will be used, casts doubt on the sufficiency of the settlement.  
B. Impact on Market Efficiency 
Market efficiency may be ancillary to the DOJ’s primary concern 
of maintaining competition and protecting consumers, but it remains 
relevant to the point of sustainable growth.96 Proponents of market 
consolidation calculate that the airline market currently underprices 
fares, and an increase in individual market share—by merging airlines 
or by market exits—will only ameliorate the current inefficiencies.97 
While raising fare prices may appear contrary to competition concerns, 
under a long-run lens, consolidating the market would assuage previous 
allocative inefficiencies and allow airlines to move closer to Pareto 
optimal pricing.98 The Delta-Northwest and United-Continental 
mergers arguably proved the benefits of achieving economies of scale. 
 
94. See AAI Letter, supra note 83, at 10 (“[D]ivestitures to smaller LCCs will 
have no system-wide impact, and indeed arguably reduce the likelihood 
that Southwest or JetBlue could conceivably discipline the oligopoly 
behavior of the ‘Big 3.’”). 
95. See Mauricio Emboaba Moreira, John F. O’Connell & George Williams, 
The Viability of Long-Haul, Low Cost Business Models, 2 J. of Air 
Transp. Stud. 69, 88 (2011) (finding that LCCs have no more than a 
10% cost advantage over legacies through three studies).  
96. Antitrust policy concerns the total welfare standard, not the consumer 
surplus standard. See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare 
Paradox, 7 J. Competition L. & Econ. 133, 162 (2010) (“As a surplus 
criterion, as opposed to welfare optimization, the total surplus standard 
is consistent with the antitrust methodology.”).  
97. See, e.g., Paul Mifsud et al., Commentary: United + Continental Is a Big 
Win for All Stakeholders, 329 Airfinance J. 6 (2010) (“What we found 
was that, for the decade ending in 2009, the industry produced an average 
of 7% excess capacity, and this factor alone led to $70 billion in net losses 
(in 2009 $), or negative 5.7% in revenue. The elasticity of demand analysis 
concluded that the industry underpriced the product by 11% over the 10 
years ending 2009. . . . The only way the industry could have priced the 
product above its true economic cost would have been to reduce the 7% 
excess capacity by raising revenue to the required level. Of course, this 
was not possible because every airline had to grow market share in order 
to lower relative unit costs and expand valuation multiples.”). 
98. Id. 
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Both airlines saw a reduction in both fixed99 and variable costs100 after 
consummating their transactions. Moving forward, the new American 
can expect similar reductions in operation costs and increased profits.  
Conclusion 
The airline market continues to consolidate in an attempt to 
achieve economies of scale. The DOJ, in recent years, exercised a unique 
and relaxed antitrust policy in the airline industry. Filing suit to block 
the American–US Airways merger appeared contrary to that prior 
policy; however, the DOJ’s antitrust policy in the airline industry did 
not change in any meaningful way, and future proposed mergers can 
expect similar treatment, albeit not legacies. The complaint outlined 
very real concerns of anticompetitive effects that will result from the 
merger, yet the divestitures instituted in the settlement remedy a 




99. See Philip G. Gayle & Huubinh B. Le, Measuring Merger Cost Effects: 
Evidence from a Dynamic Structural Econometric Model 33 (Jan. 8, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/ 
conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2013&paper_id=122 (finding 
that the post-merger United-Continental had a $6,479 lower than mean 
fixed costs among other airlines and post-merger Delta-Northwest had a 
$5,478 lower than mean fixed costs). 
100. See Id. at 29–30 (calculating a $7.50 decline in marginal costs for Delta-
Northwest and a $13.60 decline in marginal costs for United-Continental). 
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